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Chapter 2

Is it Actually Violence? Framing
Technology-Facilitated Abuse as Violence
Suzie Dunn
Abstract
When discussing the term “Technology-Facilitated violence” (TFV) it is often
asked: “Is it actually violence?” While international human rights standards,
such as the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (United Nations General Assembly, 1979),
have long recognized emotional and psychological abuse as forms of violence,
including many forms of Technology-Facilitated abuse (United Nations, 2018),
law makers and the general public continue to grapple with the question of
whether certain harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors are actually forms of
violence. This chapter explores this question in two parts. First, it reviews three
theoretical concepts of violence and examines how these concepts apply to
Technology-Facilitated behaviors. In doing so, this chapter aims to demonstrate how some harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors ﬁt under the
greater conceptual umbrella of violence. Second, it examines two recent cases,
one from the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) in Canada and a
Romanian case from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), that
received attention for their legal determinations on whether to deﬁne harmful
Technology-Facilitated behaviors as forms of violence or not. This chapter
concludes with observations on why we should conceptualize certain
Technology-Facilitated behaviors as forms of violence.
Keywords: Technology-Facilitated violence; transgender; critical race theory;
coercive control; continuum of violence; law
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Introduction: Words Matter
The words used to describe a phenomenon shape the legal and social understanding of that experience. A change in terminology around a particular
behavior can in turn change the norms of that society. This was demonstrated in
the 1970s when feminist advocates in North America began calling for the
recognition of and end to sexual harassment (Backhouse, 2012a; Backhouse &
Cohen, 1978; MacKinnon & Siegel, 2004). Prior to that time, much of what was
redeﬁned by these advocates as “sexual harassment” had previously been
considered harmless ﬂirtation or “boys being boys.” In many situations, women
were expected to take responsibility for provoking or encouraging men’s sexual
aggression toward them (Weiss, 2009). Unwanted sexual attention from men was
something that might not have been viewed as entirely polite but should be
tolerated by women, if not considered complimentary. At any rate, such
behaviors were normalized and minimized.
Reframing unwanted sexual attention as sexual harassment altered the social
acceptability of that behavior. This change in understanding did not come easily;
in fact, many entrenched norms around gendered sexual expectations remain in
place today, with some individuals continuing to brush off the harms of sexual
harassment (Quinn, 2000). However, following the work of feminists who
developed new terminology and reframed the issue, new laws that helped protect
women from this harmful and discriminatory behavior were introduced. For
example, in Canada, sexual harassment was recognized under human rights
legislation as discrimination based on sex (Campbell, 2013). Due to the cultural
changes that came along with the advocacy work undertaken by feminists and the
shift in the legality of the behavior, people began to see sexual harassment as
unacceptable and harmful. This altered the social and legal boundaries of what
was considered sexually appropriate behavior (Balos, 2004). As this demonstrates,
identifying and naming harms can have signiﬁcant societal impacts.
At the present time, TFV is a relatively new phenomenon that is not well
understood by general society. It faces the same challenges of tolerance and
minimization that sexual harassment faced – and continues to face (Fairbairn,
2015). Scholars, legislators, advocates, and the general public are still grappling
with what new behaviors such as online stalking, image-based sexual abuse, and
harmful digital misrepresentations are and how they should be condemned or
regulated, if at all (Henry et al., 2020; Powell & Henry, 2017). Even with some
emerging laws that address certain forms of TFV, such as those that prohibit the
nonconsensual distribution of intimate images, people continue to be blamed for
the Technology-Facilitated abuse they experience (Henry et al., 2020; Waldman,
2019). For example, some abusers feel entitled to hack into women’s online
accounts in order to steal their nude photos to share on the internet (Massanari,
2017) or create simulated images of women engaging in sexual acts that they did
not do using photoshop, deepfakes, and computer-generated images (Dunn,
2020). Women have been blamed for this type of abuse because they took sexualized images of themselves to begin with or for being celebrities with sexual allure
(Marwick, 2017). Furthermore, feminists who have faced multiyear online
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campaigns against them, where groups of abusers have published their home
addresses, created images of them being raped and beaten, threatened them with
death and rape, and bombarded them with sexist and racist commentary, have
been told they are overreacting when they complain and have had their experiences minimized by the public and the police (Jane, 2016; Kidd & Turner, 2016).
They have been told it was just words and pictures on the internet and their fears
were dismissed as an overreaction (Filipovic, 2007). In some cases, they have had
to ﬂee their homes, close their digital platforms, and cancel their events due to
Technology-Facilitated attacks (Kidd & Turner, 2016). These instances, which
were often rooted in sexism, caused them to feel fearful, and some targets of these
attacks described their experiences as violence (Jane, 2016; Kidd & Turner, 2016).
Yet, there remains uncertainty on where to draw the line between what aspects of
these behaviors should be considered unacceptable or even violent.
These types of harmful behaviors are collectively known by a variety of names:
TFV (Bailey & Mathen, 2017), cyberbullying (Bailey, 2016), trolling (Citron,
2014), online abuse (McGlynn & Rackley, 2017), cyberviolence (Peterson &
Densley, 2017), digital harassment (Powell & Henry, 2017), TechnologyFacilitated coercive control (Dragiewicz et al., 2018), symbolic violence (Barratt,
2018), and representational violence (Hall & Hearn, 2019), among others (Loise
Backe, Lilleston, & McCleary-Sills, 2018). It can be difﬁcult to determine what
terms to use when a new phenomenon like this occurs or when advocates call for a
new cultural understanding of an issue. This is particularly true if the new deﬁnition pushes back against entrenched stereotypes and systemic power structures.
Even among those who support a new understanding, ﬁnding consensus on terminology is not an easy task for complex and nuanced concepts like TFV. More
precise terminology is useful when examining speciﬁc behaviors such as imagebased sexual abuse, doxing, and digital stalking (Loise Backe et al., 2018), but as
an overarching term for behaviors that result in the harms described below, I
argue that we should use “TFV.”
“TFV” is preferred over “cyberviolence” because although it is a lengthier and
less evocative term, it is a broader term that captures a wider range of technologies. The term “cyber” ﬁnds its roots in control and networked systems and was
popularized in science ﬁction in the 1980s and 1990s by authors who described
cyberspace as virtual or digitally connected spaces (Azmi & Kautsarina, 2019),
such as in William Gibson’s (1984) Neuromancer. Many forms of TFV occur in
digital and networked spaces like the internet, but other forms of technology that
are not connected to a network, such as some video or audio recording devices,
are also used, making “technology” a more encompassing term. The term “cyber”
also suggests a separate world in cyberspace, one that is distinct from the physical
world (Azmi & Kautsarina, 2019). In our current society, our digital experiences
are as much a relevant and integrated part of our everyday lives as our physical
ones. Furthermore, for reasons described below, I argue that many of these
abusive Technology-Facilitated behaviors are a form of violence that should be
situated on the continuum of violence and, as such, should be broadly deﬁned as
“violence.” To do otherwise risks minimizing the severity of these actions and fails
to recognize their interconnectedness with other more familiar forms of violence.
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Not recognizing these behaviors as violence may limit a person’s access to legal
protections and can reinforce social norms that view this harmful behavior as
acceptable or causing minimal impact.

Old Meets New: Concepts of Violence in a Technological Era
To begin to understand the concept of TFV, it is worthwhile to ﬁrst look at
existing concepts of violence to consider some common characteristics of violent
behavior, the systemic factors that contribute to violence, and the resulting harms
caused by violence. As many forms of TFV are highly gendered and racialized
(Amnesty International, 2018; McGlynn & Rackley, 2017), this chapter will rely
on three concepts of violence that originate from gender-based and critical race
theorists, including the continuum of violence (Kelly, 1988), coercive control
(Stark, 2007), and critical race theory, which examines systemic violence
(Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw, 1993). These theories will be used to
illuminate why certain Technology-Facilitated behaviors can (and should) be
understood as violence.
In conceptualizing what is understood as TFV, this chapter adopts a broad
understanding of violence that is not limited to criminal or otherwise legal
deﬁnitions of violence, which themselves vary widely. There may be some
instances where the legal understanding of violence should be limited to harmful
physical contact and others where a broader deﬁnition that includes psychological
and TFV will be appropriate. As such, not all forms of violence will reach a legal
threshold (Bonnet, 2015), but all forms of this broader understanding of violence
should be considered socially unacceptable. It is important to note that while the
law plays a valuable role in shaping societal norms around which types of
behavior are acceptable or not, the legal system has not always been a substantially effective or accessible tool to address violence (Backhouse, 2012b; Burgin &
Flynn, 2019; Dunn, Lalonde, & Bailey, 2017). This is particularly true for communities that have been historically over-policed or under-protected due to systemic factors such as classism, racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia
(Ashley, 2018a, 2018b; Matsuda, Lawerence, Delgado, & Crenshaw, 1993;
Walcott, Foster, Campbell, & Seally, 2016). For some communities, the legal
system itself has been a site of violence and criminal laws that are framed as
protecting vulnerable members of society have resulted in disproportionate
incarceration of their members (Delgado, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2013). Due
to this, we should not rely on legal institutions as the sole authorities to dictate the
deﬁnition of violence and the solutions to it. Instead, a social and contextual
understanding of what constitutes violence should be adopted to examine and
critique the law’s deﬁnition of violence and its enforcement of related laws. This
chapter seeks to achieve this in its examination of two case studies.
As new concepts of violence like TFV emerge, the categorization of what is
considered violent within a community can be contested (Fairbairn, 2015).
It often requires advocacy and education within the community to shift cultural
concepts of violence. This can be seen in the case of family violence that was once
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understood as legitimate family discipline, or that of marital rape that was once
understood as an acceptable form of sexual interaction in a marriage, which are
now understood as forms of violence (Balos, 2004; Koshan, 2017). One of the
greatest challenges in conceptualizing harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors
as violence is the lack of physical contact between the target and the perpetrator
in many of the cases. This is due to limited societal views of violence as only
encompassing physical attacks; however, as will be examined below, violence can
include a breadth of harmful behaviors that cannot be disentangled from physical
abuse and may on their own be equally, if not more, debilitating for the survivor
(Follingstad & Rogers, 2013). However, not every unwanted touch or unwelcome
contact through technology will be considered violent nor should they be. We
must avoid developing an understanding of violence that is so broad that it waters
down the signiﬁcance of violent behaviors or results in overly punitive measures
for less consequential behaviors or acts of self-defense. In some cases, a single
incident will be severe enough to be considered violence, such as threats of murder
or rape, where in other cases, actions may only become violent due to their
cumulative or coercive nature, such as unwanted text messages or cruel comments
on a person’s social media page (Bonnet, 2015; Dragiewicz et al., 2018). Social
and legal understandings of violence may require a contextual analysis that takes
into consideration situational and systemic factors, as well as the impacts of the
behaviors and their connection to other acts of violence. Taking this into
consideration, the following section will discuss how certain TechnologyFacilitated behaviors can be captured in the folds of existing theoretical understandings of violence.

The Continuum of Violence: Interconnected Behaviors
Writing decades prior to the advent of social media and smartphones, feminist
scholar Liz Kelly (1987) adopted a broad view of sexual violence against women,
recognizing the interconnectivity between harmful physical, sexual, emotional,
and psychological acts. After interviewing women with experiences of sexual
violence, she found that discrete acts of physical and psychological attacks on
women’s sexual autonomy could not be understood as independent of each other,
as they each played an overlapping role in controlling women’s behavior. In her
understanding of violence, Kelly (1987) focused on the overall impacts experienced by the survivor, describing how women reacted differently to various
experiences of sexual coercion, both physical and psychological. Their reactions
were inﬂuenced by the nature of the incident, the relationship between the parties,
the amount of time over which the abuse occurred, and the feelings of fear
induced by the incident. After listening to women’s reactions to various behaviors,
Kelly (1987) concluded that a hierarchy that places physical attacks at the top, as
most serious, and emotional abuse at the bottom, as least serious, did not reﬂect
the reality of women’s lived experiences of sexual violence. Doing so minimized
nonphysical harms caused by these behaviors. In her book, Surviving Sexual
Violence, Kelly (1988) outlined her theory of the continuum of sexual violence.
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She describes the ways in which actions like street harassment, coercive sex, and
threats systemically limited women’s sexual autonomy and contributed to their
sexual domination. They caused women to feel a great deal of fear, and Kelly
(1988) argued that these behaviors should not be overlooked because of the lack
of physical damage to a woman’s body. By focusing on the ways these intersecting
harmful behaviors were a part of larger system that supported sexual violence
against women, she included actions used to degrade, control, and cause fear in
women within the conceptual parameters of sexual violence, both physical and
psychological.
Kelly’s (1987, 1988) work addressed the continuum of sexual violence, but the
model of a continuum of violence has been adopted more generally by scholars
such as Rashida Manjoo (2012), Emma Renold and Christine Barter (2005), and
Kathy Sanders-Phillips (2009) who applied the continuum to all violence against
women, violence experienced by youth in residential children’s homes, and
racialized youth, respectively. Other national and international bodies, including
the United Nations, have adopted a similarly broad deﬁnition of violence that
includes emotional and psychological violence and forms of TFV (Fairbairn,
2015).
The theory of a continuum of violence has been applied to TechnologyFacilitated behaviors that share the underlying characteristics of coercing and
controlling women, thus ﬁtting within Kelly’s (1987, 1988) concept of violence.
Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley, and Ruth Houghton (2017) drew on Kelly’s
continuum of violence when examining what they labeled the “continuum of
image-based sexual abuse” (p. 1; see also, Henry et al., 2020). These authors
situate image-based sexual abuse on a continuum with other forms of sexual
violence. Image-based sexual abuse includes the creation or distribution of sexual
images without consent, which captures things like the nonconsensual distribution
of intimate images, upskirting, voyeurism, sexual deepfakes, digitally manipulated sexual images, images obtained via hacking, sextortion, images of sexual
assault, and unsolicited dick pics (see e.g., Henry, Flynn, & Powell, 2018, 2019).
These Technology-Facilitated behaviors are used to degrade women and control
their sexual autonomy, resulting in signiﬁcant harms. Women whose sexual
images have been shared without consent have reported similar psychological
impacts as survivors of sexual assault, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts (Bates, 2016), and some have drastically altered their behaviors in response to the misuse of their images (Powell,
Henry & Flynn, 2018). In the case of shared images of sexual assault, Alexa
Dodge (2016) found that the demeaning commentary that has accompanied these
images normalizes and minimizes sexual violence against women and girls.
Beyond sexual violence, many other forms of Technology-Facilitated behaviors
have the effect of controlling or causing fear in women include stalkerware and
death threats on digital platforms (Citron, 2014; Parson et al., 2019). These
Technology-Facilitated behaviors are interconnected with other forms of physical, sexual, and psychological forms of violence as they share the underlying
commonality of what Kelly (1987, 1988) conceptualized as violence. These
behaviors are used to dominate, intimidate, and control the women who are

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3869759

Is it Actually Violence?

31

targeted, negatively inﬂuencing their autonomy. Additionally, they are linked to a
larger system of behaviors that inﬂuence societal norms that minimize and
normalize violence.

Coercive Control: Beyond the Physical
Evan Stark’s (2007) theory on coercive control demonstrates the ways that
physical and psychological behaviors of one partner are used to break down the
personality, self-worth, and agency of the other in an intimate partner violence
relationship. This form of control relies on systemic inequalities such as gender
inequality and employs ongoing behaviors that wear a person down over time. Its
collective nature is the core of its severity, not any particular discrete physical act
that causes injury. This can cause a level of invisibility to the harmful actions as it
is difﬁcult to spot the forest among the trees. It might seem unusual for a person to
experience extreme fear for forgetting to text her partner at a speciﬁc time, but if
failing to do so results in their partner relentlessly threatening and limiting her
freedoms in their home for weeks afterward, it is a legitimate reason to be afraid.
Women in abusive relationships can be controlled using physical force in combination with psychological abuse, but as noted by Anne Jones (2000), prolonged
psychological abuse that leaves the woman in a state of fear and without control
can be an equally effective form of abuse as physical attacks. As long as the
perpetrator can destroy the will of his target, the behavior achieves its aims. The
cumulative controlling effects of ongoing and repetitive attacks are part and
parcel of the violence in those relationships, whether they are physical or not.
Heather Douglas, Bridget Harris, and Molly Dragiewicz (2019) have applied
the theory of coercive control to TFV. In their study on the use of technology in
domestic and family violence, they argue that some forms of technologyfacilitated behaviors are “inextricably tied to” (p. 553) other forms of domestic
and family violence and the systemic factors that contribute to their persistence.
Douglas, Harris, and Dragiewicz (2019) identiﬁed isolation (through controlling
digital communication), monitoring, stalking, image-based sexual abuse, social
media–facilitated abuse, and online harassment as some of the more commonly
reported forms of Technology-Facilitated behaviors they would categorize as
coercive in violent relationships. Technology added to the feelings – and reality –
of the perpetrator being ever-present and ever-threatening. In the case of stalkerware, Citizen Lab described this technology as having a “predator in your
pocket” because it allows for an abusive partner to consistently monitor their
spouse’s movements and communications (Parsons et al., 2019). Ongoing
tracking and excessive monitoring through technology can induce feelings of fear
and a loss of autonomy in the same ways that physically controlling behaviors
can. A simple buzz of a text may cause a person whose daily behaviors are being
monitored by their abusive partner to feel legitimately fearful.
The use of this technology to dominate and control another person is another
tool in the web of tactics employed by a violent perpetrator that can have a
cumulative effect on the person targeted (Dragiewicz et al., 2018). The
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overarching effect of breaking down the agency in the person remains the same
whatever tool the abuser uses. These harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors
can have a physical and psychological impact on the person targeted. Nicola
Henry and Anastasia Powell (2015) have described reactions to TechnologyFacilitated harms like these as embodied harms. They found that it is a myth
that because the certain actions are not directed on the physical body or occur in
digital spaces they have no effect on the physical body or social self. There are real
psychological, physical, and social effects that impact a person’s mental health,
personal relationships, social position, and personal safety resulting from TFV.
Creating bright lines between physical, psychological, and Technology-Facilitated
behaviors when examining violent relationships would require a parsing of the
cumulative behaviors that collectively lead to the loss of agency and feelings of
domination by the person targeted. Creating these types of silos can dilute the
severity of the overall experience and fails to recognize the physiological and
psychological harms caused by all forms of violence.

Critical Race Theory: Systemic Violence
Critical race theory is foundational to understanding the ways words and images
reinforce systemic factors, such as racism, sexism, and colonialism, that dehumanize particular groups and can be understood as a form of violence themselves
(Jackman, 2002). Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado, and
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1993) book, Words that Wound, describe the inseparability
of racism, hateful speech, and violence. They argue that racist speech and images
can be a precursor to physical violence against people of color, such as inciting
lynch mobs and contribute to normalizing physical and sexual violence against
women of color. Racist speech and images can incite physical attacks, including
violence by the state, as was raised as a concern in 2020 when a white woman in
Central Park called the police falsely alleging that a Black man had threatened her
physically (Bellafante, 2020), but they also dictate ideas of racial inferiority that
make racial domination permissible and Black, Indigenous, and people of color
(BIPOC) legitimate targets of physical attacks and social control (Walcott et al.,
2016).
Understanding the ways in which words and images can be viewed as forms of
systemic violence against BIPOC is valuable in conceptualizing many forms of
harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors as violence. For example, degrading
images and speech are used in digital spaces to dehumanize, instill fear, and
reinforce the subordination of BIPOC (Awan & Zempi, 2015; Nakamura, 2013),
members of the LGBTQI community (Lenhart, Ybarra, Zickuhr, & Price-Feeney,
2016; Quodling, 2016; Stanko, 2005), women and girls (Duggan, 2014; VeraGray, 2016), and other equality-seeking groups (Bailey, 2007).
Amnesty International’s (2018) #ToxicTwitter report found that being a
woman of color in a leadership role online or speaking about race or gender
online can trigger digital attacks that use threatening and discriminatory language
and images. Some abusive Twitter users will seek out hashtags associated with

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3869759

Is it Actually Violence?

33

equality issues and will encourage others to attack individuals promoting
equality-focused campaigns. They use onslaughts of threatening, degrading, and
violent comments, including death and rape threats, against individuals advocating for equality online. Other racist, sexist, and homophobic tropes are used
during these online attacks to reinforce systemic power structures and can drive
users who resist them off of digital platforms out of fear. Words and images like
these cross over the line into violence when they create reasonable feelings of fear,
reinforce the subordination of speciﬁc groups in ways that normalize violence
against them, and dehumanize particular individuals or groups.
Manipulated images, decontextualized images, and images of violence play an
important part in reinforcing the degradation of certain groups and normalizing
violence against them. For example, after Black actor Leslie Jones starred in a
new version of Ghostbusters, a campaign of individuals who were opposed to a
Black woman starring in the ﬁlm began trolling Jones with violent commentary
and images that had racist and sexist undertones (Citron, 2019). The campaign
was encouraged by conservative media commentator Milo Yiannopoulos, who
was known for instigating online mob attacks against people he criticized (Silman,
2016).1 Jones reported that she was sent doctored images that made it appear as
though she had been ejaculated on, her website was hacked, her nude photos were
stolen and posted online, photos of her personal identiﬁcation documents were
shared, and memes of a dead gorilla were posted on her website (Citron, 2019).
These images violated her privacy and used racist and sexist tropes, along with
other information, to make her feel fearful and to dehumanize her, thus ﬁtting
within the concept of violence described by the above critical race theorists.
Individuals like Leslie Jones may ﬁnd themselves singled out for attacks, but
many of these violent attacks are interconnected and led by discriminatory groups
that organize in digital spaces. These abusers often ﬁnd their homes in extremist
alt-right, white supremist, homophobic, and misogynistic groups whose online
messaging boards purposefully share discriminatory messages that dehumanize
and encourage physical violence against equality-seeking groups (Baele, Brace, &
Coan, 2019). Abusers’ messages are often veiled under arguments for freedom of
expression, conservative values, or described as jokes not to be taken seriously.
However, much of the language and images on these boards actively reinforce the
systemic dehumanization of certain groups of people (Conway, Scrivens, &
Macnair, 2019).
In more extreme cases, multiple mass shootings have been linked to these
online hate groups, one of which was live streamed on the internet. Several of the
shooters have published racist and sexist manifestos on 8chan, which is an online
forum that has been called a “cesspool of hate,” where users have praised the
mass killer’s “high score” for the number of people killed (Conway et al., 2019,
pp. 8 & 13). These spaces are used to recruit and radicalize their users and use
memes, GIFs, and specialized jargon to reinforce their messages (Conway et al.,
2019). Similar groups, such as Incels, have advocated for and celebrated physical
violence against women and employ a similar pattern of shared images and
language to reinforce their messages of violence. Incels have been connected to at
least two mass killings where the killers have been upheld as heroes of the
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movement for murdering people in revenge for their lack of sexual access to
women (Baele et al., 2019). What makes the words and images used by these
groups violent is their ability to reinforce systemic discrimination that dehumanizes marginalized groups, normalizing or inciting real world attacks against
them.

Technology-Facilitated Violence and the Law
This section will review two recent cases that addressed whether certain technologically facilitated behaviors could be legally recognized as violence. As noted in
the previous section, the law should not be viewed as the primary source of how
we understand violence. However, it plays an important role in shaping societal
understandings of violence, and some courts have recently begun interpreting
whether certain forms of harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors should be
understood as violence. The following two cases were chosen because they both
address laws where emotional and psychological abuse is included in the deﬁnition of violence, making them broad enough to capture many forms of TFV. The
ﬁrst case, AB v CD (2020 BCCA 11),2 involved a father sharing private information about his transgender son with fringe-conservative media websites that
promote transphobic messaging. It was selected due to the large amount of media
attention the case was given around the question of what could be considered
family violence. The second case, Buturugă v Romania (2020), involved an intimate partner violence relationship where an allegedly abusive ex-husband
accessed his ex-wife’s computer documents and social media accounts without
her consent. It was selected because it was one of the ﬁrst cases out of the ECtHR
that recognized Technology-Facilitated privacy invasions as a form of violence.

AB v CD
In a 2020 decision, AB v CD, the BCCA set aside a ﬁnding of family violence
from a lower court in a case where a father, CD, had used social media platforms
and provided interviews to online newspapers in which he misgendered his
transgender son, AB, and shared private information about him. His online
interviews exposed his son to substantial violent commentary and unwanted
transphobic attention from the greater community. One of the questions before
the court was whether CD’s actions met the deﬁnition of family violence. Family
violence under the British Columbia Family Law Act (2011) includes “psychological or emotional abuse of a family member” such as “intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats” and “unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a
family member’s ﬁnancial or personal autonomy” (s. 1).
AB was a teenage boy who was assigned female at birth. When he sought
gender-afﬁrming medical care, his doctors and his mother supported his decision
to begin taking masculinizing hormones so his body would better match his
gender identity. AB had been struggling with challenges related to his gender,
including the stresses he felt about his body’s “femaleness” and the bullying and
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harassment that accompanied it. He had attempted suicide in March 2018, in
part, due to the stresses related to his gender identity. His mother was fearful that
if AB did not get access to gender-afﬁrming medical treatments he might attempt
suicide again. With gender-afﬁrming treatment, AB’s doctor believed some of
AB’s stresses would be relieved, and that he would be less likely to be harassed by
others, reducing his risk of suicide. However, AB’s father, CD, did not engage
with his son’s medical team and did not support the decision. Instead, CD ﬁled a
claim in family court disputing AB’s ability to make this medical decision without
CD’s consent and later instigated a public campaign that included speaking to
online conservative media sites about his disapproval of his son’s medical decision
speciﬁcally and gender-afﬁrming medical treatments for transgender youth more
generally. The story was widely covered by both mainstream and fringeconservative media sources.
During interviews with online fringe conservative media sites and in his court
ﬁlings, CD misgendered his son, publicly rejecting his child’s gender identity and
name change. The two media sites of concern, Culture Guard and The Federalist,
are fringe online conservative media sites who write articles opposing gender
transitions, particularly those involving minors.3 In those interviews, CD shared
detailed personal and medical information about AB and trivialized AB’s suicide
attempt. The authors of the articles also misgendered AB and published unredacted copies of AB’s medical documents that identiﬁed him. Court documents
showed that comments on these stories included derogatory statements about AB,
claiming he was mentally ill, encouraging his suicide, suggesting he be kicked out
of his family home, suggesting he be disowned, and advocating for a “post birth
abortion” of AB (AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 604, para 33). The father, CD,
expressed excitement about the media attention the story was getting and stated
that he hoped that Fox News and Breitbart would pick up the story. Brietbart is an
alt-right website known for spreading conspiracy theories and hiring provocative
racist, sexist, and transphobic writers. Milo Yiannopoulos, the man credited for
instigating the attacks on actor Leslie Jones, once worked there as a senior editor
(Hunt, 2016). CD personally engaged in the comment sections on Culture Guard’s
website, offered to speak as a keynote speaker at a Culture Guard event (which he
later declined due to a court ordered publication ban), and posted commentary on
social media sites. Culture Guard also raised funds for CD’s legal costs related to
the case (AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 604).
In response to these acts, AB told the courts he was “terriﬁed” that his father
would go public with information that would identify AB, which could lead to
“terrible bullying and violence” (2019 BCSC 604, para 32). AB was concerned
about his physical and emotional safety around CD and felt scared to watch the
interviews his father gave to Culture Guard. CD continued to engage online about
his son’s gender and medical decisions even after being cautioned by the courts
that his behaviors were damaging to his son’s well-being.
Lower lever courts (2019 BCSC 254 & 2019 BCSC 604) determined AB was a
mature minor who was able to make decisions about his health without the
consent of his father. A declaration was made that CD’s behavior toward his son,
including misgendering his son to third parties,4 was a form of family violence and
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granted a protection order that restrained CD from sharing personal and medical
information about AB with media outlets or on social media and required CD to
refer to AB by his proper name and gender. The Court noted that CD’s ongoing
behavior put AB at risk of additional emotional and physical violence, including
exposing AB to “degrading and violent public commentary” on social media
(AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 604, para 68) and putting AB at “a high risk of
public exposure and acts of emotional or physical violence, in the form of
bullying, harassment, threats and physical harm, including self-harm” (AB v CD
and EF, 2019 BCSC 604, para 70). CD appealed the decision.
At the Court of Appeal, AB’s ability to consent to his medical treatment was
upheld, but the declaration that CD’s actions were family violence and the protection order were set aside, largely due to procedural issues regarding which
section of the Family Law Act (2011) was applied and what evidence was before
the court (AB v CD, 2020 BCCA 11). The protection order was replaced with a
conduct order (an order to manage behaviors that might frustrate the resolution
of a family law dispute) that prohibited CD from providing information about
AB’s gender identity or medical information to third parties and requiring CD
refer to AB as male and by his chosen name. On the question of violence, the
majority of the Court of Appeal found that the father’s refusal to acknowledge
AB’s gender was “clearly hurtful” to AB, but stated that there was insufﬁcient
evidence that CD intended to hurt his son (AB v CD, 2020 BCCA 11, para 171).
When considering the father’s behaviour and the concept of family violence,
the Court’s (AB v CD, 2020 BCCA 11) focus on the father’s intention was
problematic, as the Family Law Act’s (2011) deﬁnition of family violence does not
specify that the psychological or emotional abuse needs to be intentional. However, there was evidence that CD’s behaviors had emotionally and psychologically
harmed AB, and his father had neglected to acknowledge that harm. The Court
noted that CD did not engage with AB’s medical team to better understand his
son’s medical decision and had not considered how AB would be negatively
affected by his engagement with the public online forums that were advocating
against young transgendered people’s rights to make medical decisions related to
their gender. The Court also noted that CD ignored the effect derogatory public
comments would have on his son. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal found that
CD’s actions were not emotional abuse amounting to family violence, but simply
“misguided” and “irresponsible” behavior on the part of the father (AB v CD,
2020 BCCA 11, para 179).
Focusing on the intention of the abuser rather than the impact of the abused in
this way has the potential to permit a great deal of abusers to avoid responsibility
for their behavior (Jackman, 2002). Racist, sexist, and transphobic online commentators often claim to be protecting traditional values or are only making
comments as jokes, but the impact for those targeted is consequential (Conway
et al., 2019). To claim ignorance or a lack of intent to harm his son, CD should
not have been able to rely on his own reckless disregard of the impact his online
campaign would have on his son, particularly because the harms were well
documented by the courts. While CD cannot be held responsible for the individual actions of others on the internet, his ongoing engagement with digital
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groups that were encouraging physical and social harm against his vulnerable son
should have played a larger role in the analysis of the overall impact of CD’s
behavior. The Court’s focus should have been on the actual impact his ongoing
actions.
The Family Law Act (2011) speciﬁcally includes psychological and emotional
abuse as a form of family violence, and TFV has been recognized as a form of
family violence in other cases. However, when commenting on the legal understanding of family violence, the Court of Appeal in this case warned that “some
caution should be exercised in identifying ‘psychological or emotional abuse’ as
constituting ‘family violence’” (AB v CD, 2020 BCCA 11, para 175). This is a
troubling direction for the court to take as it minimizes the signiﬁcant harms AB
experienced from his father’s Technology-Facilitated actions. AB v CD was not a
case where the person’s Technology-Facilitated actions – misgendering his child
in public digital spaces known for dehumanizing transgender people – had a
minimal emotional or psychological impact on the person targeted. AB provided
evidence to the court that CD’s ongoing behavior was causing AB to fear for his
physical and emotional safety and was impacting his autonomy. CD’s child was
at risk of self-harm and had medical professionals who recognized the harms
experienced due to transphobia by his father and the general public. The courts
recognized that CD had made his son an “unwilling poster child” in a divisive
public debate about transgender youth rights that made dehumanizing comments
about his son and transgender people (AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 604, para 69).
Moreover, lower level courts in British Columbia have recognized forms of TFV as
a form of family violence in the past. In previous cases, the courts found that
excessive amounts of text messages and emails (X v Y, 2015; M(MW) v K(JD),
2015) caused psychological or emotional harms amounting to family violence. The
judgments in these cases did not focus on whether the abuser intended to harm the
other person by their actions. Instead, in both cases, the abuser did not appreciate
the full consequences of his behavior; however, the courts focused on the impact on
the person being abused to determine if the Technology-Facilitated behavior was a
form of family violence rather than the abuser’s intention of his actions (X v Y,
2015; M(MW) v K(JD), 2015).
Considering this, CD’s behavior could be likened to critical race theories
(Matsuda et al., 1993; Jackman, 2002) on violence where words and images are
used to reinforce the systemic dehumanization of marginalized groups and risk
inciting physical violence against them. Research has shown that transgender
people are disproportionately at risk of discrimination, violence, and suicide
(Ashley, 2018b). Due to the high levels of discrimination transgender people
experience, Canada has recently recognized gender identity and expression under
federal and provincial human rights legislation (e.g., Canadian Human Rights
Act, 1985). As a transgender youth, AB was a member of group who experienced
systemic discrimination. His father’s actions were directly linked to AB’s social
location in this group, and CD was aware that AB had been harassed due to his
gender identity and had attempted suicide in part due to challenges he faced
having his proper gender recognized and afﬁrmed. Yet, CD recklessly continued
to make public statements rejecting his son’s gender identity, engaging with
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transphobic media outlets, prioritizing his own agenda over the safety, and wellbeing of his child.
In sum, I would argue that the lower level courts’ understanding of violence
was more aligned with the concept of TFV outlined in this chapter than that of
the Court of Appeal. In the lower court’s decision, the “degrading and violent
public commentary” was acknowledged as contributing to AB’s fears, and it
recognized that CD’s behavior could incite emotional and physical violence
against his son (AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 604, para 68). In the future, it is
important that courts look to the impact of Technology-Facilitated behaviors in
controlling the targeted individual as well as whether systemic factors, like
transphobia, are present in the cases where the deﬁnition of violence includes
psychological harms and limitations on autonomy.

Buturugă v Romania
In early 2020, the ECtHR held that “cyberviolence” is a form of intimate partner
violence and that Romanian authorities had a positive obligation to investigate an
abusive partner’s unauthorized access to his partner’s computer and social media
accounts as it related to her case of domestic violence (Buturugă v Romania).
In Buturugă v Romania (2020), Gina-Aurelia Buturugă brought a complaint
against the Romanian government for failing to adequately investigate complaints she made against her husband, who she alleged had physically assaulted
her, threatened to kill her, and accessed her electronic documents and social
media without consent, copying her private correspondence, photos, and other
material. According to Buturugă, her husband, who is only named in the decision
by his initials (“MV”), had physically abused her during their relationship. She
stated that when they began discussing divorce in late 2013, the violence escalated
to the point that her husband threatened to kill her by throwing her off the
balcony to make it look as though she died by suicide. Several days later, MV
allegedly hit Buturugă on the head and threatened to kill her with an axe.
Buturugă visited the hospital where she required signiﬁcant care and obtained a
medical document that detailed her injuries.
According to Buturugă, the authorities failed to adequately investigate her
claims and tried to convince her to withdraw her complaints of physical violence.
When she later reported that MV had accessed her computer and social media
without her consent, she asked the police to search their family computer to
collect evidence that her husband had violated her privacy as a part of his pattern
of abuse. However, she was told by the police that the privacy invasion was
unrelated to the violence she reported. In 2014, MV violated a protection order
that was put in place to protect Buturugă from violence by sending threats
through a family member, chasing Buturugă down the street, and trying to
convince her to drop the criminal charges. The police closed her case in early
2015, stating the threats against her were not serious enough to warrant investigation, there was no evidence that MV had been the one to cause her injuries
(although the police did not investigate who else could have caused them), and the
alleged violation of her privacy was irrelevant to the subject matter of the case.
Buturugă unsuccessfully contested the decision in the Romanian courts.
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Dissatisﬁed with the treatment of her case by the Romanian police and the
courts, Buturugă ﬁled a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that the Romanian
government had not properly investigated her case and had violated her right to
be free from inhumane or degrading treatment and her right to privacy under the
European Convention on Human Rights. After hearing the case, the ECtHR
found Romania had a positive obligation to take reasonable measures to investigate Buturugă’s claim as a form of domestic violence, including the unwanted
access of her computer and social media accounts by her ex-husband. In its
decision, the ECtHR found that the police had not adequately investigated who
had caused Buturugă’s injuries or the alleged privacy violations. Importantly, the
Court noted that unauthorized access to someone’s computer, digital surveillance,
and the taking, storing, and manipulating of data and images were recognized
forms of violence under both domestic and international law. Under Romanian
law, family violence includes emotional harms, including hindering a woman
from exercising her fundamental rights and liberties, such as her right to private
life, as well as physical and sexual violence. The ECtHR found that TechnologyFacilitated privacy invasions could be considered a form of violence.
This decision by the ECtHR recognizes the role of TFV in violent intimate
partner relationships that ﬁt within with some of the theories of violence discussed
above. As noted by Evan Stark (2007) and Anne Jones (2000), psychological harms
that make a person feel as though they are being surveilled and controlled can be as
effective in dominating a person in a violent intimate partner relationship as physical
violence. The Romanian police and courts failed to understand how MV breaking
into his ex-wife’s computer to access her digital content was part of a larger pattern of
violence in their relationship that signiﬁcantly impacted Buturugă’s agency and
autonomy. Entrenched norms of what “real” (i.e. physical) violence looks like likely
inﬂuenced their decision. According to Buturugă, the police were encouraging her to
drop the claims against her husband’s physical abuse, and they neglected to include
the privacy invasions in their investigation of his abuse, which suggests there may
have been systemic factors at play that minimize gendered-based violence generally
and TFV speciﬁcally. By separating the privacy invasion from the physical harms in
their investigation, the police failed to see what McGlynn, Rackley, and Houghton
(2017) described as the “commonalities between seemingly disparate phenomenon”
that lie along the continuum of violence (p. 4).
In a violent intimate partner relationship, when an ex-partner who has been
exhibiting controlling behaviors gains access to their ex’s social media accounts
and other personal digital ﬁles, it contributes to feelings of the partner being everpresent and controlling. The ECtHR made the decision in this case to ensure the
harms caused by unauthorized access by an abusive partner to a person’s digital
content were not minimized. In the context of this relationship, which had a
history of physical violence, threats, and harassment, it made sense that MV’s
nonconsensual access to Buturugă’s digital information was a part of his pattern
of control in this abusive relationship. This places TFV on the continuum of
violence and acknowledges its role in violent coercive relationships, something
that the ECtHR afﬁrmed.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3869759

40

Suzie Dunn

Conclusion
There is power in recognizing and naming violence, including psychological and
TFV. As society and the courts make determinations on what violence is, it is
critical that they avoid minimizing the effects of TFV. Like the early days of
antisexual harassment advocacy, there is a need for a cultural shift around TFV.
Naming something gives it clarity and helps people situate it within their cultural
understanding of what behaviors are socially acceptable and which are not. In our
current society, TFV needs to be recognized and condemned. We cannot rely
solely on legal decisions, such as the two discussed above, to guide this understanding, however, legal deﬁnitions do help shape societal views on violence and
can provide useful legal remedies. Additional efforts in education, advocacy, and
changes to societal attitudes are needed so targets are not blamed for their
victimization are also critical components to changing social views on TFV.
Building on the theories developed by critical race, feminist, and antiviolence
scholars and advocates, this chapter argued that TFV can be recognized by
looking for behaviors that control, dominate, and instill fear in the person
targeted, particularly those behaviors that rely on existing systemic power
structures to further dehumanize and limit the autonomy of a particular person or
group. Understanding harmful Technology-Facilitated behaviors can be complex
and may require examining the situational or systemic factors at play to assess
whether it meets the threshold of violence. In AB v CD (2019 BCSC 1057, 2019
BCSC 254, 2019 BCSC 604, 2019 BCCA 256, 2019 BCCA 297, 2020 BCCA 11)
and Buturugă v Romania (2020), systemic issues of transphobia and sexism,
respectively, played a role in the TFV experienced. The publishing of private
information online, misgendering a transgender youth on a digital platform, and
accessing an ex-spouse’s computer and social media without consent must be
situated in larger patterns of systemic violence made to control, demean, and
signiﬁcantly limit the autonomy of the person targeted. This chapter argued that
the Court of Appeal in AB v CD (2019 BCCA 256, 2019 BCCA 297, 2020 BCCA
11) was too limited in its assessment of violence, problematically relying on the
intention of CD rather than the impact of his actions on AB. Whereas in Buturugă
v Romania, the ECtHR was able to correctly situate MV’s actions within the
context of domestic violence. These are just two examples of the way courts can
interpret TFV, but they illustrate two potential paths the courts may take in the
future: one that minimizes TFV and one that illuminates it. In the future, we
should look to the theories mentioned in this chapter to help us understand TFV
and its place in our social and legal understanding of violence.

Notes
1. Milo Yiannopoulos is an alt-right public ﬁgure who was well known for his racist,
homophobic, and sexist commentary online. His commentary was known to
instigate harassment campaigns against the people he criticized. His account was
permanently suspended from Twitter in 2016 due to his abusive and hateful
commentary (Hunt, 2016).
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2. See also: AB v CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 1057, 2019 BCSC 254, 2019 BCSC 604; AB
v CD, 2019 BCCA 256, 2019 BCCA 297.
3. Each of these contain “transgender” sections, for example: https://www.cultureguard.com/category/transgender/; https://thefederalist.com/tag/transgender/.
4. “Attempting to persuade AB to abandon treatment for gender dysphoria;
addressing AB by his birth name; referring to AB as a girl or with female pronouns
whether to him directly or to third parties; shall be considered to be family violence
under s. 38 of the Family Law Act” (2019 BCSSC 254, para 70).
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